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From Bloodless Revolution to Bloody 
Counterrevolution: The Adana Massacres of 1909 1 
Bedross Der Matossian 
University of Nebraska–Lincoln
Abstract
The historiography of the Adana Massacres of 1909 is represented by two diverging 
views. While some Turkish scholars deny the involvement of the local government 
officials in the massacres by putting all of the blame on the Armenians who revolted as 
part of a conspiracy to establish a kingdom in Cilicia, some Armenian scholars, whose 
work is overshadowed by the Armenian genocide, accuse the Committee of Union 
and Progress (CUP) of acting behind the scenes to destroy the Armenian economic 
infrastructure in Adana in order to curb any future political and economic development 
in the area. By deviating from the existing historiography, the present article contends 
that the Adana Massacres should be viewed as part of the revolutionary process which 
led to the erosion of social and political stability in the region, the creation of weak 
public-sphere institutions, and intensification of the existing economic anxieties, all of 
which led to the enactment of violence against the vulnerable Armenian population of 
Adana. Understanding the factors and the motives that led to the enactment of violence 
will shed new light on understanding the future acts of violence perpetrated against the 
indigenous Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire.
Keywords: Ottoman Empire, violence, revolution, massacres, Armenians, public sphere
On 29 August 1908, one month after the Young Turk Revolution, Mihrdat Noradoungian, 
an Armenian intellectual from Istanbul, wrote a lengthy opinion piece entitled “The 
Price of Freedom” in the Armenian daily newspaper Puzantion. In this lengthy article, 
Noradoungian argued that people were looking with hesitation at this freedom that came 
about without any bloodshed. What Noradoungian was implying in the article is that 
the Freedom after the revolution should have been received through violence—probably 
reminiscent of the violence during the French Revolution which was able to get rid of the 
ancien régime: 
The change that took place a month ago had the biggest peculiar advantage, to which the 
entire world views with bewilderment, and that is the lack of blood and uproar. Both of 
these factors are regular phenomenon in these kinds of situations. . . Though during the 
[last] 15 years a lot of blood has spilled, there was the fear of greater bloodshed which 
did not happen. One should know that this [bloodshed] has become a natural law and 
that natural laws are unavoidable. Whatever did not happen in the beginning could still 
happen. Whatever the revolution did not do, the counterrevolution will be able to do. 
There is only one way in order to prevent the occurrence of this contingency (bloodshed) 
and that is discretion, modesty, wisdom, and patience. New freedom is always fragile. Let us 
be careful.2 
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This connection between Revolution, Blood, and the ancien régime was endemic and 
not only to the Armenian press in the Ottoman Empire. During the first days of the 
constitution, while the revolutionary festivities were at their height, the ethnic presses 
(Armenian, Arabic, Greek, Ottoman Turkish, and Ladino, among others) warned people 
to be vigilant about the existing fragile situation and be wary of former officials of the 
ancien régime.3 However, in comparison to other newspapers, the Armenian press dealt 
intensively with the concept of the ancien régime in its present form, not in its past one.4 
One such editorial sought to enlighten the public about the danger of the situation and the 
calamities that they should expect.5 The article is crucial in that it predicts the upcoming 
calamity of the counterrevolution. It advised Armenians to not create any pretext for the 
eruption of these agitations. On the contrary, the editorial argued that it is the duty of the 
Armenians to act with love toward their Turkish brothers and be careful with every act 
and every word that could make them bitter against Armenians and incite the people of 
the ancien régime. “We repeat that we need to be careful from shouting ‘Armenian,’ or to 
talk about an independent Armenia,” argued the editorial. “The majority of the nation is 
in agreement that reforming the condition of the Armenians of Turkey is dependent on the 
reform of Turkey.” The editorial ends by recommending that Armenians cooperate with 
their Turkish compatriots “who support us and curse the ancien régime.”6
With this connection between revolution and blood in mind, the present article discusses 
the correlation between the 1908 revolution and the Adana Massacres of 1909. After briefly 
reviewing the existing historiography of the Adana Massacres, I will introduce a new 
approach to the understanding of these massacres in the larger context of the revolution, 
specifically the development of a weak public sphere and the erosion of social and political 
stability, all of which led to the escalation of violence in Adana. Afterward, I will discuss 
the impact of the Young Turk Revolution on Adana and demonstrate the ways in which 
the revolution precipitated the ethnic tensions leading to the massacres.
The Young Turk Revolution of 1908
The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 represents an important historical juncture in 
Ottoman history and the history of the modern Middle East, not as a new beginning, but 
rather as a major catalyst in accelerating the dissolution of the empire. Thus, these two 
contradicting paradigms of a new beginning and dissolution were interconnected and 
went hand in hand in marking the last phase of Ottoman history, the Second Constitutional 
Period (1908-1918) that ended with the defeat of the empire in World War I Within this 
period two interrelated events took place that shaped the political scene of the era: (1) 
The counterrevolution of 31 March 1909 which was initiated by the reactionary forces 
within the empire and (2) the Adana Massacres (April 14-17, April 25-27) which led to the 
destruction of the physical and the material presence of Armenians in Adana.
The counterrevolution was not a spontaneous outburst by dissatisfied elements 
in Istanbul; rather, it was organized by oppositional elements mainly represented by 
conservative religious circles within the empire.7 On the night of April 12, the troops 
of the First Army Corps mutinied and marched toward Ayasofya Square, near the 
parliament, accompanied by a large number of people in religious garb (softas) shouting 
slogans in favor of the sultan and demanding the restoration of the Sher’ia.8 This resulted 
in the resignation of Hilmi Pasa’s cabinet, which was promptly accepted by the sultan.9 
By royal order, on April 14, Tevfik Pasa was appointed the Grand Vezir and Ismail Kemal 
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was elected the President of Parliament.10 This was a huge blow to the Committee of 
Union and Progress (CUP) whose members either fled or were hiding. On April 17 the 
CUP began to act. The Action Army (Haraket Ordusu) left Salonika and headed to Istanbul 
to restore public order and discipline among the rebellious troops. It established its 
headquarters at Aya Stefanos and began negotiations with the new cabinet.11 After failed 
negotiations, the Action Army entered Istanbul on April 23 and, after several skirmishes, 
took control of the city. 
The Adana Massacres of 1909, which became a turning point for the Armenians living in 
the Ottoman Empire, were one of the earliest manifestations of violence during the Second 
Constitutional Period (1908-1918). Furthermore, the massacres represent a microcosm of 
the deterioration of ethnic conflict in Anatolia and its culmination in the destruction of 
the indigenous Armenian population during World War I Understanding the factors and 
motives that led to the enactment of violence will shed new light on the future acts of 
violence perpetrated against the indigenous Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire. 
The present article contends that the Adana Massacres should be viewed as an integral part 
of the ongoing power struggle in Anatolia and the Arab provinces after the revolution.12 An 
important factor that contributed to the escalation of ethnic tensions was the emergence of 
a weak public sphere within the empire after thirty years of the Hamidian despotic regime. 
Hence, to better understand the escalation of ethnic tensions in the empire, it is important 
to problematize the notion of modern public sphere and understand its implications and 
challenges within the Ottoman milieu.13 Doing so will provide us with better ways of 
understanding communal violence as a by-product of modernity. 
The Public Sphere and the Ottoman Empire
The notion of the public sphere refers to a social space in which private citizens gather 
as a public body with the rights of assembly, association, and expression in order to form 
public opinion.14 The history of the notion of the public sphere in the Ottoman Empire 
has yet to be written and the present study does not undertake that task.15 Of course, the 
public sphere, both in its pre-modern and modern forms, existed in the Ottoman Empire.16 
However, it had a different background and was affected by different factors from the 
European milieu.17 As a result of modern urban development, the public sphere began 
to enter into its modern form. The modern public sphere(s) in the empire was spurred 
by the development of peripheral capitalism and through the opening of urban spaces, 
in the form of public squares, gardens, and wider roads. In addition, the process was 
accompanied by the proliferation of cafés, associations, theaters, and scientific and literary 
societies, as a result of which literary public spheres were formed in the empire. However, 
the main factor that led to the proliferation of these public spheres in the empire during 
the nineteenth century was the press in general and newspapers in particular.18 The official 
Ottoman press began to be published in the nineteenth century and was followed by the 
emergence of the private press. The transformation of the literary public spheres into 
political public spheres in the modern sense took place throughout the century, reaching 
its peak with the promulgation of the Ottoman constitution in 1876.19 In fact, the creation 
of the private press and the proliferation of the ethnic press in the second half of the 
nineteenth century further developed the notion of multiple public spheres as opposed to 
the public sphere dominated by the Ottoman ruling elite. 
In 1878, however, Sultan Abdülhamid dissolved the Ottoman parliament and derailed 
the constitution, putting an end to the political public sphere. Hence, the institutions that 
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once served as the basis of the developing public sphere(s) were derailed and weakened. 
He also established one of the most sophisticated spying systems in the history of the 
Ottoman Empire. As a result, by the beginning of the 1880s, the ethnic groups’ journalist 
activities shifted West, from Lebanon, Syria, and Anatolia to European cities and Egypt. 
Here, an exilic public sphere was established in which exiles of different ethnic backgrounds 
expressed their political views, discussed their projects for the empire, interacted with 
each other, and attempted to mobilize their host governments by using various means of 
expression, from exilic media to public gatherings and discussion.20
After the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, this exilic public sphere was transformed into 
a homeland public sphere. The revolution allowed for an immediate boom in the serial 
publications of different ethnic groups in the empire.21 In the two years after the revolution, 
censorship was nonexistent. In the first year alone about 200 periodicals were published in 
Istanbul.22 Hence, the media that served the development of multiple/competing public 
spheres prior to the Hamidian period were reinstated during the post-revolutionary period. 
However, these contentious and weak public sphere(s) that lacked strong institutional 
basis would become the medium through which the existing tensions in the empire were 
going to surface, demonstrating the incompetence of the local administration to deal with 
contentious situations. The weak public sphere(s) became a medium through which both 
the satisfied and the dissatisfied elements aired their content or discontent with the new 
regime and deliberated the political future of the empire by using the tools of modernity. 
In addition, the weak public sphere(s) also became an important vehicle for the enactment 
of violence by the dissatisfied groups. Thus, the relationship between public sphere and 
violence is crucial to understanding the massacres carried out against the indigenous 
Armenian population. After the revolution, the growth in Adana’s public sphere not only 
fomented political activism within formerly outlawed groups, but it also contributed to 
an escalation of ethnic tensions. The physical and verbal manifestations of Armenians in 
the public sphere in the forms of cultural and political processions, the bearing and selling 
of arms in public,23 and theatrical presentations as well as the use of print media sent 
alarming vibes among the dissatisfied elements, which began to use the same medium to 
air their anxieties about and discontent with the new created order. Thus, the public space 
in Adana would become not only the place for the re-enactment of identities; it would 
also become a vehicle through which the existing political, social, and economic anxieties 
would be manifested in two waves of massacres which took place in conjuncture with the 
counterrevolution. 
Historiography and the Adana Massacres of 1909
The study of ethnic strife, violence, and repression in the Ottoman Empire in general 
and in Anatolia in particular remains marginalized in the historiography of the Ottoman 
Empire. Only a handful of scholars have attempted to put these subjects at the core of 
their inquiries.24 However, most of these works concentrate on the Armenian Genocide 
during World War I and do not consider the incidents of violence prior to the war.25 
Other scholars attempt to represent the acts of violence that took place at the end of the 
nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries as part of a linear process that 
culminated in the extermination of the Armenians.26 A major methodological deficiency 
of these works stems from the failure to appreciate that violence during the early phase of 
the Second Constitutional Period was an integral part of the revolutionary process. While 
some Turkish scholars deny the involvement of local government officials in the massacres 
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by blaming the Armenians who revolted as part of a conspiracy to establish a kingdom 
in Cilicia,27 some Armenian scholars, whose work is overshadowed by the Armenian 
genocide, accuse the CUP of acting behind the scenes to destroy the Armenian economic 
infrastructure in Adana in order to curb any future political and economic development 
in the area.28
Development of Adana’s Public Sphere(s)
It is impossible to understand the development of Adana’s public sphere without 
understanding the impact of the revolution on the Anatolian provinces and the ways in 
which it led to the emergence of contentious public sphere(s). The Young Turk Revolution 
caused major changes in the dynamics of power within the provinces, leading to an erosion 
of social and political stability. By disturbing a thinly balanced power equilibrium, the 
revolution produced a great deal of dissatisfaction within some segments of the population. 
The sudden mushrooming of Young Turk cells and clubs in the provinces caused extreme 
anxiety among the notables and the ulema (religious clerics) in the Anatolian provinces. 
Although the CUP had branches in all Anatolian and Arab provinces, it was not in full 
control of the provinces. A major factor in the deterioration of the intra-ethnic relationship 
among the Muslims in Anatolia was the dismissal of local officials and their replacement 
with CUP members or people loyal to the CUP. This contributed immensely to the rising 
tension between the CUP and the people of the ancien régime, mainly because a whole 
stratum of notables who had benefited from the ancien régime had lost power. Hence, one 
cannot understand the changes in Adana after the 1908 revolution without understanding 
the regional waves of discontent manifested after the revolution, especially in the 
Anatolian provinces. What distinguished Adana from other provinces was its economic 
and agricultural centrality to Anatolia—which attracted thousands of migrant workers 
arriving from Hadjin, Erzerum, Bayburt, and Bitlis—and its complex ethnic composition, 
which was a main catalyst in the deterioration of this ethnic relationship.29 Therefore, I 
argue that the conditions created after the revolution and the emergence of contentious 
public sphere(s) prepared the ground for a violent backlash. 
Adana was also an important spiritual and economic center for Armenians in Anatolia. 
It housed the Sea of the Catholicosate of Sis (Kozan).30 In addition, the city had eight 
churches, two of which were Gregorian, one Protestant, and one Catholic. There were also 
Greek, Syrian, and Chaldean churches.31 Armenians had two schools, the Apkarian and the 
Ashkhenian schools, the French had the Jesuit missionary school for boys and girls, and the 
Americans had the Girls College. In Tarsus, Americans also had St. Paul’s Institute College.32
Prior to the massacres of 1909, Adana’s population consisted of 62,250 Muslims; 30,000 
Armenians; 5,000 Greeks; 8,000 Chaldeans; 1,250 Assyrians; 500 Christian Arabs; and 
200 foreign subjects.33 The Muslim population of Adana included Turks, Kurds, Fellahs, 
Circassians, Avshars, Cretans, and nomads. In addition, every spring about 30,000-40,000 
migratory workers would come to Adana from Aleppo, Harput, Sivas, Diarbekir, Erzerum, 
Hajin, Bitlis, Bayburt, and Erzerum to work as farmers, tilling, reaping, and cultivating the 
cotton fields, or to work in factories.34 The Muslim migrant workers always exceeded the 
Armenian migrant workers by a ratio of 2:1. 
Adana was also the center of the cotton trade on the Cilician Plain.35 David Fraser who 
visited Adana prior to the 1908 revolution argued that at the end of the nineteenth century it 
was customary for 60,000 laborers to visit Cilicia annually for the purpose of assisting with 
the harvest. However, he argues that this annual migration had ceased at the beginning 
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of the twentieth century because the resident population aided by steam ploughs, steam 
threshers, and reaping machines was not able to undertake the labor by itself. This point is 
extremely important because it demonstrates the ways in which the introduction of modern 
agricultural and production technologies have caused substantial dissatisfaction among 
the migrant workers who used to benefit from the pre-modern agricultural mediums 
and has created what Ayhan Aktar calls “accumulated envy” toward the Armenians.36 
This “accumulated envy” would reveal itself in violent backlash by the migrant workers 
against the Armenians. In addition to this, Adana also housed several large establishments 
involved with ginning, spinning, and weaving. Among these, the most important factory 
was owned by the Greek Trypani Brothers who introduced the cotton industry to Cilicia.37 
In addition, the Deutsche Levant Cotton Company, which was financed by German, 
Swiss, and Austrian financiers, was also active in the region.38 The Armenian population 
was very involved in trade and industry. They played a predominant role in exporting 
materials from Adana.39 Armenian sources indicate that Armenian prosperity in Adana 
was lamented by some Turkish notables, such as Abdü lkadir Bagdadizade, one of the 
most influential notables in Adana.40
The Ottoman Public Sphere in Adana: The Climax of Contentious Politics between the 
CUP and the Notables
As soon as the constitution was enacted, people in Adana and Mersin began 
rejoicing. Masses were held in honor of the sultan and the Ottoman nation.41 However, 
these festivities of the revolution were only euphoric feelings that did not reflect the 
different social sectors’ actual attitudes toward the revolution. The revolution and the 
reinstatement of the constitution in Adana led to the rise of new figures. Ihsan Fikri, a 
self-acclaimed Young Turk, suddenly became a public figure. Fikri played an important 
role in organizing festivities in honor of the revolution. At the end of the festivities, Fikri 
sent a congratulatory telegram to the CUP branches in Manastir, Salonica, and Istanbul 
on behalf of the people of Adana. The next day the CUP Central Committee asked Fikri 
to establish a CUP branch in Adana.42 To counter the CUP’s influence, Abdü lkadir 
Bagdadizade,43 one of the most influential notables of Adana, formed a group called the 
Agricultural Club (Zirâ at Kulübü ) composed of Adana notables, people from Idlib, and 
softas.44 They were supported by another anti-CUP committee, the Scientific Committee 
(Cemiyet-i Ilmiye). As with the other CUP branches in the provinces, people from the 
ancien régime entered the ranks and the first task of the new CUP branch was to force the 
local vali (governor) to resign.45 Bahri Pasa resigned and for some time the CUP branch 
administered the province. It also succeeded at removing Kâzim Bey, the chief of police 
( polisemüdürü ), and police superintendent (komiser) Zor Ali from their positions.46 In 
addition, the CUP began sending delegates, consisting of one Armenian and one Turk, 
to villages to preach to the masses about the constitution. In order to better understand 
the tension that arose between the CUP and the local notables, it is important to give a 
brief historical background of Ihsan Fikri. 
Ihsan Fikri, whose original name was Ahmed Tosun, had been an officer of the Salonica 
Agriculture Department. He was later exiled to Diyarbekir and then to Payas. After his 
exile to Payas, he represented himself as a liberal. Bahri Pasa, the vali, interceded with 
the authorities on his behalf to end his exile.47 After returning to Adana, he married the 
daughter of a local property owner by the name of Menan Bey. Prior to the revolution, 
Fikri had been the principal of the Handicraft School (Sanayi Mektebi) but was fired by 
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the vali, who replaced him with Gergerlizade Ali Effendi. After the revolution and the 
establishment of the CUP branch in Adana under his leadership, Fikri began to persecute 
his opponents, particularly Gergerlizade.48 As a result, two groups emerged in Adana, 
one supporting Fikri and another supporting Gergerlizade.49 This tension can be best 
defined as CUP versus the local notables. In this intra-ethnic struggle the press played 
an important role. In the post-revolutionary period five newspapers were published in 
Adana: Seyhan, Yasasin Ordu, Itidal, edited by Ihsan Fikri; Rehberi Itidal, owned by Ali 
Ilmi Effendi; and Çukurova, a weekly newspaper published by Mahmud Jelaleddin. Itidal 
and Rehberi Itidal were in constant conflict. The latter was also supported by Çukurova. 
According to Terzian, Ihsan Fikri wrote erratically, praising the Armenians one day and 
attacking them the next. 
After Bahri Pasa resigned, he was replaced by Mirliva Ali Pasa, who generally 
kowtowed to the CUP. When Cevad Bey was appointed vali, tensions began to escalate 
dramatically. Ihsan Fikri, seeing Cevad Bey’s weakness, tried to manipulate him into 
removing Gergerlizade from his position as the principal of the school. Gergerlizade, 
however, gained the vali’s favor. In addition, Cevad Bey used to frequently visit the 
Agricultural Club and the Scientific Committee.50 This angered Fikri, who began openly 
attacking the vali in Itidal, even calling for his resignation, but to no avail.51 Furthermore, he 
claimed that government was nonexistent in Adana and that it was people like Abdülkadir 
Bagdadizade who were truly running the affairs of the country. In this tensed atmosphere, 
Zor Ali, the former police commissary (komiser) of Adana who had been dismissed by the 
CUP, arrived in Adana and declared himself a member of the Fedakâ rini Millet, a branch 
of the Ittihadi Mouhamadi, and called on people of the same mind to join him.52 In this 
atmosphere of intra-ethnic tension, news of the counterrevolution reached Adana, further 
altering the power balance within the provinces. 
The Armenian Public Sphere: Testing the Limits of Freedom
The Armenian festivities and demonstrations in honor of the constitution on 24 July 
1908 were especially striking. The public sphere created after the 1908 revolution allowed 
Armenian political parties to be active in Adana. Armenian cultural revival began. Poetry, 
odes, and dramas about the Armenian national past began to be published and performed, 
causing anxiety among the local Muslim population. In addition, Armenians, “intoxicated 
with the new wine of liberty, often gave offense by wild talk or arrogant behavior.”53 
In an interview with an Armenian newspaper after the massacres, missionary Christie 
positioned at Tarsus argued that there is no proof that the Christians as a whole desired 
separation from the Ottoman people or government. Granted, he argued that there were 
a very few foolish men (Armenians) who by their boasting and threats exasperated the 
Turks. However, he adds that “their acts and words ought not to be taken as justifying 
in the slightest degree the cruelties that make this recent massacre worse than any that 
have gone before it.”54 Armenian activities in the post-revolutionary period entailed 
physical and verbal manifestations in the public sphere causing much anxiety among the 
dissatisfied elements. For example, Itidal, the main Young Turk organ in Adana edited by 
Ihsan Fikri, reported that on Sunday 29 March 1909 a play was performed by Armenians 
at the Casino of Ziya Pasa in Mersin.55 In the words of one contemporary Ottoman official 
in Adana, “At that night Armenians had opened the first curtains of revolt” (Iste Ermeniler 
ilk isyan perdesini o gece açmislardir).56 The play was entitled Temurlane and the Destruction of 
Sivas.57 The local mutessarif (subgovernor), as well as other officials, was invited to attend 
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the play. At the beginning of the play, Temurlane gives an order to exterminate all the 
Armenians. A fierce struggle takes place between Temurlane and an Armenian king. The 
king, along with his servant and his daughter, becomes Temurlane’s prisoner. The king, 
hands chained and wearing a thorn crown, sits hopelessly in a cell allocated to him by 
Temurlane. Suddenly, two spirits appear before the king telling him that he will reclaim 
his kingdom through the unity of his nation. And when the king tells the spirits that all 
of the Armenians have been massacred, the spirits answer as follows: “These are enough, 
do not feel sorry, thanks to unity the day will come that you will restore your monarchy 
[kraligin tasdik edecekler]. You are going to preserve your independence, be restful, do 
not detach yourself from unity, once more in the future you will regain your crown.” 
Itidal reported that when the curtain closed all of the Armenians in the audience began 
shouting and applauding “Long live Armenia,” “Long live Armenian kingdom,” “Long 
live Armenians.”58
On another occasion, a performance of Hamlet by the Armenian students of St. Paul’s 
College of Tarsus made government officials and the local mufti (Islamic scholar) uneasy. 
Helen Davenport (Brown) Gibbons, who taught at the school, described the play and her 
role in putting on the performance in detail in a letter sent to her mother on 7 April 1909. 
Gibbons described that when things began to go badly for Hamlet’s stepfather, people 
stopped fanning. The attending dignitaries became uneasy, and hunched their shoulders. 
They kept their eyes glued to the stage. She continued: 
They are not familiar with our great William, and believe, no doubt, that we invented the 
play as well as the actors’ costumes. Horror of horrors! We had forgotten what they might 
read into the most realistic scene. An Armenian warning for Abdul Hamid? The assassins 
mastered the struggling king. He lay there with his red hair sticking out from his crown, 
and the muscles of his neck stiffened as he gasped for breath while his throat was cut with 
a shiny white letter-opener.59
In addition to these, the relationship in Adana between Armenian ecclesiastic leadership 
and the local government deteriorated after the 1908 revolution, particularly after the 
removal of the vali Bahri Pasa who had a cordial relationship with the Armenians and 
especially with Bishop Moushegh Seropian.60 Fearful of what might happen, the Catholicos 
of Sis, Sahag, sent telegrams to Istanbul warning of imminent massacres in the area. The 
Ottoman-Turkish newspapers of Istanbul reacted negatively to these telegrams, saying “we 
do not want to believe in the existence of the threat of massacre.”61 At the time, the prelate 
of Adana, Bishop Moushegh, was on a mission to Istanbul. When he returned to Adana he 
found that letters from the villages warning of imminent threats have accumulated. Bishop 
Moushegh also sent a pastoral letter to the Armenians of Adana emphasizing the need for 
harmony among the people.62 However, the uncertain situation and the rising tension led 
Bishop Moushegh to encourage Armenians to buy arms63: 
We advise the people, in order to be able to fulfill their duties towards the country and 
constitution, every person should be armed more or less according to his ability. That 
readiness should be at the same time somehow a means for self-defense, against an 
unfortunate attack, until the constitutional government comes to their aid.64
Dr. Christie, the American missionary, criticized Bishop Moushegh’s words and deeds 
and those of the young men who were following him. He argued that it was wrong to 
bring tin boxes of arms and ammunition to Mersin addressed to Armenians in Adana.65 
However, he explained that even these do not prove that there was an intention to 
160 B. der MAT o s s i A n i n Gen oc i d e Stu di e S a nd Pr eve nt i on  6 (2011) 
rebel against the government.66 Thus, Bishop Moushegh in the eyes of the local Muslim 
population became an agitator and the source of tensions for inciting the Armenians 
against the Turks and encouraging them to establish Kingdom Cilicia.67 As a result, 
twenty-five days before the massacres Bishop Moushegh was banished from Adana to 
Cairo by orders from the vali.68
The Consolidation of Violence: The Breaking Point
In March 1909 ethnic tension began to deteriorate dramatically, as manifested in a couple 
of sporadic attacks on Armenians.69 One of these attacks became the catalyst precipitating 
the first wave of the Adana Massacres/Clashes. On 28 March 1909, an Armenian named 
Hovhannes was attacked by a group of Turks, led by a man named Isfendiar.70 During the 
ensuing fight, Hovhannes killed Isfendiar, wounded some of the other attackers, and fled 
to the Armenian Quarter in Adana. From there he escaped to Cyprus. Isfendiar’s funeral 
attracted not only those angered by the killing, but also much of the element dissatisfied 
with the new order, the constitution, and its Armenian “collaborators.” The body was 
dragged through the streets for exhibition and became a catalyst in the manifestation of 
the existing economic and political anxieties. This immediately led to the mobilization 
of the masses and prepared the ground for the enactment of violence.71 Inflammatory 
remarks were made in the mosques and it was proclaimed that the Armenians of Adana 
had risen and were “killing true believers and burning their houses.”72 Isfendiar’s family 
demanded that the vali capture the murderer.73 A few days later, one of Hovhannes’s other 
attackers died from the wounds he received, elevating the level of anger and excitement 
among the Muslim population. As the situation intensified, the vali of Adana telegrammed 
Istanbul warning of an imminent threat in Adana. Adil Bey, on behalf of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs responded, “The financial institutions along with foreign buildings should 
be protected and peace should be preserved” (Müessesât-i mâliye ile emâkin-i ecnebîyenin 
muhâfazasi ve iâde-i âsâ yise dikkatolunmasi).74 Some Armenian sources understand this 
telegram as an order to massacre the Armenians.75 This sentence, however, is too vague to 
necessarily be understood in that way. With the arrival of news about the counterrevolution 
from Istanbul, the situation exploded. 
The First Waves of Massacres/Clashes (April 14, 15, and 16)
“What could I do, if there is Constitution.  
Whatever the majority wants they will do so.”76
In Adana, Tuesdays were market days. Peasants would travel from their villages 
to Adana in the morning and return in the evening. On Tuesday, 13 April 1909, these 
peasants did not return to their homes. It is also noteworthy that because of seasonal 
migration, 30,000-40,000 additional Armenian, Kurdish, and Turkish farm workers 
inhabited Adana.77 On April 14, the disturbances began. Armenians opened their shops 
in the early morning, but soon saw groups of Turks, Kurds, Circassians, Basibozuks,78 
Cretans, and Muslim refugees along with the seasonal workers carrying hatchets, blunt 
instruments, axes, and swords in their hands and wearing white bandages (saruks) around 
their fezzes79 in various quarters of the city.80 This made the Armenians extremely anxious, 
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and they quickly closed their shops.81 When the Muslims saw that Armenians were closing 
their shops early they too became anxious, and a rumor spread that the Armenians were 
going to attack them. The mob, consisting of Turks, Kurds, Fellahs, Circassians, Gypsies, 
and Cretan refugees along with the migrant workers, began looting and attacking the 
center of the town.82 Zor Ali, the police superintendent, rallied his troops and besieged the 
Armenian Quarter of Sabaniye. Meanwhile, Armenians took a defensive position in the 
Armenian Quarter and fortified themselves in houses.83
The first day of the massacres/clashes saw sporadic and unorganized attacks. On 
the first night, the mob began burning the Armenian Quarter.84 The attacks and the 
clashes intensified the next day.85 The majority of the Armenian population found 
shelter in Armenian churches and schools and some in foreign missions. By the third 
day, the mob grew as Turks arrived from Aleppo and Sivas to take part in the pillage. 
Since the Armenians were running short on ammunition, they asked the government for 
protection.86 In response, the vali organized a reconciliation meeting between Turkish 
and Armenian notables.87 By the fourth day the situation had calmed. It is impossible to 
accurately assess the number of casualties. Hundreds of wounded Armenians were taken 
to the Apkarian Armenian school which was turned into a hospital. Many Armenians 
escaped to Mersin.88 The carnage, looting, and killing lasted for three days (April 14, 15, 
and 16). Many Armenians were killed as well as many Muslims, some of whom were 
killed while attacking the Armenian Quarter. It seems that the first wave of massacres/
clashes was minor compared to the second wave that will be discussed next. Nevertheless, 
Armenian shops, businesses, and institutions suffered immense damage.89
Public Sphere and the Transition from Verbal to Physical Violence
Most Armenian and European sources indicate that Ihsan Fikri, the leader of the CUP 
in Adana, and his newspaper Itidal played an important role in inciting the masses before 
the initiation of the second wave of massacres.90 However, these sources do not tell us 
exactly what kind of discourse was being propagated by Itidal. This raises important 
questions about the transition from violent political discourse to physical violence. In 
cases of extreme escalation of ethnic tensions, during which the existing political and 
civil institutions are unable to contain the lawlessness and disorder of a region, the public 
sphere becomes the medium through which violence manifests itself. Furthermore, it 
contributes to the precipitation of ethnic tensions and accelerates the motives for the 
perpetration of violence against the vulnerable group. In the case of Adana, instead of 
declaring a state of siege, the local government chose to reconcile both parties who were 
involved in the violence by making superficial statements about coexistence and harmony. 
The public sphere was not restrained nor did the local government take the necessary 
steps to suppress provocative statements by reactionary groups. On the contrary, the 
printed form of communication, one of the most important components of a public 
sphere, was used to instigate the public against the vulnerable population. Hence, Ihsan 
Fikri was able to verbally attack the Armenians, using extraordinarily violent language, 
and to convince the masses that the Armenians had attempted a coup d’etat to establish 
the Kingdom of Cilicia.91 According to the British vice consul in Adana, Doughty-Wylie, 
every Turk in Adana was fully persuaded at the time that the Armenians had set fire 
to their own houses with the idea of bringing about foreign intervention. Stories about 
Armenian atrocities on Muslim men and women were also widely spread.92 According 
to Doughty-Wylie, the Turks put all of the blame on the Armenians because they 
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armed themselves and because certain delegates of the Hunchak Party, and preachers 
like Bishop Moushegh, had urged the Armenians to openly fight the Turks and set up 
a principality; the Turks also believed that they had fixed a day on which to rise and 
rebel against the Turks.93 Although Doughty-Wylie believed that the Hunchak Party 
was planning something, he nevertheless argued that they represented a fraction of the 
people. On the contrary, he argued that such widespread destruction could not have 
taken place without some “secret preparation on the Turkish side,”94 demonstrating the 
premeditated nature of the event.95
On 20 April 1909, thousands of free copies of Itidal were distributed in the streets 
of Adana. In this issue, Fikri along with his colleagues Ismail Sefa96 and Burhan Nuri 
vehemently attacked the Armenians.97 In an article entitled “An Awful Uprising” (Müdhis 
bir Isyân), Sefa stated that a wave of boiling rage and independence was destroying the 
country.98 He argued that Armenians, like the Turks, had been oppressed for thirty-
three years by the despotic regime. Then they united with the Turks and applauded 
their “holy revolution.” However, Sefa argued that Armenians soon began preparing 
themselves for the ensuing uprising by stockpiling weapons. According to Sefa, once the 
Armenians possessed weapons, their rhetoric changed. The phenomenon of Armenian 
fedayees (fighters) with Mauser riffles roaming the streets alarmed the Turks. According 
to Sefa, the first signs of agitation occurred on Friday when two Muslim youths were 
killed in the Sabaniye neighborhood. He was referring to the murder of Isfendiar. Sefa 
argued that although the vali had assured the Turkish population that he would capture 
the murderer, thus restoring order, the Armenians refused to turn over the murderer. 
For Sefa this was nothing less than an uprising (isyân). Sefa concluded that when the 
Armenians, “after all this barbarism and crime,” saw the profusion of soldiers and 
people pouring in from the villages and understood that they would not succeed, they 
stopped their attacks. 
In the same issue, an article by Burhan Nuri posed the rhetorical question “can the 
Armenians establish a state?” Burhan answered that only the foolish would believe that 
Armenians, numbering less than two million scattered throughout the empire, could defeat 
the Ottoman Empire and be able to establish an independent country.99 Burhan attacked 
the European powers in his article saying that any European power cannot impose on the 
Ottoman Empire the establishment of an Armenian state in Cilicia. Burhan concluded as 
follows: 
If the Armenians intend to form a state, the land for that state should not be in the 
Ottoman Empire, rather they should look for it in the poles, in the desert lands of Africa 
and immigrate there. They cannot reach their goal scattered in Istanbul, Adana, Aleppo, 
Diyarbekir, Bitlis, and Van.
In the section of Itidal on news from the provinces, an editorial lamented that Adana 
would be “the victim of this horrible barbarism.” The editorial argued that while the Turks 
were striving to live with the Armenians in happiness, the Armenians caused a “huge 
calamity on the head of the country through the organization of an agitation.”100
Armenians, according to the editorial, had arrived in Adana from Marash, Hadjin, 
Harput, Diyarbekir, and from the Armenian populated provinces of Anatolia. The article 
argued that by forming a majority in the area, Armenians hoped to create agitation and 
demand autonomy.101 They were encouraged in this by the success of Austria-Hungary 
in annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina and by the de jure independence of Bulgaria from 
the Ottoman Empire on 5 October 1908. For this purpose, they hoped to provoke the 
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intervention of the European powers. The article concluded by saying that “looking at the 
painful situation, there is no doubt that they [the Armenians] were the reason of their own 
destruction, the Turks, and of the country.”102
The editorial board of Itidal provided its own version of the causes and reasons for the 
deterioration of the ethnic relations and their culmination in the massacres. Whether or not 
the claims made by Itidal were true, they were vital in shaping public opinion in Adana, 
particularly the claims regarding an Armenian conspiracy. These articles in Itidal fumed 
public opinion in Adana after the first wave of massacres/clashes. 
The Second Wave of the Massacres (April 25—27)
When Armenians heard the news that additional troops were going to come to Adana 
from Mersin to help preserve order, they were elated.103 On April 25, 850 soldiers from 
the second and the third regiments arrived from Dede Agaç. After the regiments set up 
a camp in Adana, shots were fired at their tents. A rumor immediately spread that the 
Armenians had opened fire on the troops from a church tower in town.104 The military 
commander of Adana, Mustafa Remzi Pasa, made no attempt to validate these rumors, 
but nevertheless ordered his soldiers to strike back at the Armenians. On Sunday, April 
25 at 1:00 p.m. a battalion attacked the Armenian school that housed the injured from 
the first wave of the massacres. Soldiers poured kerosene on the school and set it on 
fire with people inside.105 Regular soldiers, reserve soldiers, and mobs along with the 
Basibozuks attacked the Armenian Quarter. They burned down churches and schools. 
The conflagration in the city of Adana continued until Tuesday morning, April 27, and 
destroyed the entire Armenian residential quarter and most of the houses in the outlying 
districts inhabited by Christians.106
Another factor which precipitated the massacres was the unwillingness of Turkish 
troops to maintain order. Armenian sources indicate that weapons were distributed freely 
by the government to local civilians who took part in the massacres, looting, and carnage. 
The second wave of the massacres was larger in scale and more violent than the first. 
While the massacres in the city of Adana were taking place, rumors spread throughout the 
province that Armenians had revolted in Adana, killed all the Muslims, and were going to 
destroy the villages. This caused extreme anxiety and provoked retaliatory attacks by the 
Muslims on Armenian villages.
Conclusion
More than 100 years have passed since the massacres of Adana and historians continue 
to debate what the main causes of the massacres were. Indeed, the revolution should be 
regarded as the major catalyst in the deterioration of the situation. However, the massacres 
would not have taken place without the host of other factors mentioned in this article. 
The violence inflicted on the indigenous Armenian population should be understood as a 
manifestation of the anxieties caused by the major change within the political framework 
brought by the revolution. The weak institutions of the public sphere(s) in Adana played 
a dominant role in intensifying these anxieties and causing much distress among the local 
population and the notables of the ancien régime. This anxiety was not only political; rather 
it had serious economic ramifications at a time when modern agricultural technologies 
had replaced the old ones, causing much dissatisfaction among the poor migrant workers 
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who were benefiting from pre-modern modes of production. Thus, the dominant role 
played by the migrant population in the massacres could also be interpreted as an attack 
on modernization, represented by drastic changes in the mediums of production.
The bloodshed that Mihrdat Noradoungian was so much worried about did materialize 
during the counterrevolution. What followed was two waves of clashes, massacres, 
pillaging, and looting. The complicity of local government officials, such as the vali Cevad 
Bey and the commander of the army Mustafa Remzi Pasa, is undeniable as the Military 
Tribunals and the investigation commissions sent from Istanbul attested.107 Worse yet was 
the role that one of the most important notables of Adana, Abdü lkadir Bagdadizade, and 
his faction played in the massacres.108 The CUP representative in Adana, Ihsan Fikri, along 
with Ismail Sefa, played a dominant role in shaping public opinion and transforming verbal 
into physical violence.109 The reaction of the central government and the CUP against the 
real culprits of the massacre was lenient, as the court martial’s decision attested.110 Most of 
the key architects of the massacres mentioned above received light sentences. About fifty 
Muslims (some of them innocent)111 and six Armenians were sentenced to death and many 
were sentenced to imprisonment with hard labor.112 It seems that the CUP, having just 
recovered from a huge blow as a result of the counterrevolution, was afraid to take drastic 
action against the real culprits of the massacres because it was afraid that this would have 
wider effects in the region and would endanger its existence. The Adana massacres not 
only resulted in huge Armenian loss of life, but also led to the destruction of one of the 
most important Armenian economic centers in Anatolia. 
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